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MIRAGE OF DEFENSE: REEXAMINING 
ARTICLE FIVE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC 
TREATY AITER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS 
ON THE UNITED STATES 
MicHAEL A GoLDBERG* 
Abstract: In 1949, twelve nations formed a regional alliance in an effort 
to counter perceived Soviet expansion, creating the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). Collective defense-assisting member 
states under attack by an outside country, as articulated in Article Five 
of the North Atlantic Treaty-has historically been its core function. 
Following fifty years of dormancy, Article Five was invoked after the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. This Note 
discusses the expanding role of Article Five, increasing regionalization 
challenges, and whether the Treaty's obligations compel affirmative 
actions from its members. 
INTRODUCTION 
Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty is a collective defense 
clause that provides member countries with protections against an 
armed attack.l For more than fifty years, the mere threat of its power 
was strong enough to fend off member nations' potential adversaries.2 
Until October 2, 2001, Article Five remained dormant, the world 
never witnessing its true capabilities.3 However, approximately three 
weeks after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United 
States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed to in-
* Michael A. Goldberg is the Editor in Chief of the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. 
1 North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246, 
available at http:/ /www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm. 
2 See generally North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an Encarta Encyclopedia Article, at 
http:/ /encarta.msn.com/find/Concise.asp?z=l&pg=2&ti=761573186 (last visited Nov. I, 
2002) [hereinafter North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. 
3 See What is Article 57, NATO Issues, at http:/ /www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm; NATO 
Formally Invokes Article Enabling Collective Self-Defense, jAPAN EcoN. NEWS WIRE, Oct. 2, 2001. 
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voke Article Five for the first time.4 Surprisingly, its effects have been 
less than dramatic.5 
This Note examines the background surrounding the signing of 
the Treaty and the circumstances that encompassed Article Five's in-
vocation. It focuses on the issues and problems Article Five has en-
countered over its fifty-year history, including the expanding role of 
NATO, increasing regionalization challenges and, most significantly, 
whether the Treaty's obligations compel affirmative action from its 
members. 
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
A. Formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
In the spring of 1948, President Truman and his administration 
held secret talks in Washington, D.C. to discuss the impending en-
largement of Soviet power.6 In the aftermath of World War II, the 
government in Moscow had "proved unwilling to let its ideology com-
pete freely in the political marketplace. "7 In effect, the Soviet master 
plan sought to exploit economic dislocation and the war wariness of 
Europe and the United States.8 The forcible installation of Commu-
nist governments throughout Eastern Europe, territorial demands by 
the Soviets and their support of guerrilla war in Greece, and regional 
separatism in Iran appeared to many as the first steps of World War 
IIJ.9 Many Western leaders believed the policies of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) threatened international stability and 
peace.l0 
In response to this perceived Soviet expansion, the United States 
joined a number of regional alliances. The most significant of these 
occurring on April 4, 1949 with the signing of the North Atlantic 
Treaty and the subsequent creation of NATO.ll The North Atlantic 
Treaty produced a deterrent balance against the Soviet Union: anal-
4 NATO Formally Invokes Article Enabling Collective Self-Defense, supra note 3. 
5 See NATO Aircraft Guard U.S. Skies, CNN.com, Oct. 12, 2001, at http:/ /www.cnn.com/ 
2001/US/10/12/ret.nato.awacs/index.html. 
6 NATO ENLARGEMENT 32 (Ted Galen Carpenter & Barbara Conry eds., 1998). 
7 RoBERTS. McNAMARA, THE EssENCE OF SECURITY 33 (1968). 
8Jd. 
9 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, supra note 2. 
Io Id. 
11 See NATO: Welcome to NATO, at http:/ /www.nato.int/welcome/home.htm (last visited 
Nov. I, 2002). 
2003] Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Post September 11 79 
Hance of twelve independent nations conunitted to each other's de-
fense.12 The original signatories were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, the United Kingdom, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States.l3 Since its founding 
fifty-three years ago, seven additional countries, including Greece, 
Turkey, Germany, Spain, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, 
have acceded to the Treaty, forming the current Alliance of nineteen 
nations.14 
B. The North Atlantic Treaty 
The North Adantic Treaty consists of a preamble and fourteen 
articles.15 The preamble states the purpose of the Treaty: to promote 
the conunon values of its members and to "unite their efforts for col-
lective defense. "16 Collective defense, defined as assisting a member 
state under attack by an outside country, is its core function,l7 This 
objective is articulated in Article Five of the Treaty, known as the 
"conunitment clause. "18 Article Five states: 
The Parties agree that an armed .attack against one or 
more of them in Europe or North America shall be consid-
ered an attack against them all and consequently they agree 
that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exer-
cise of the right of individual or collective self-defence rec-
ognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, 
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such ac-
tion as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, 
to restore and maintain the security of the North Adantic 
area. 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result 
thereof shall inunediately be reported to the Security Coun-
cil. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security 
12Jd. 
13 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, supra note 2. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16Jd. 
17 Paul E. Gallis, CRS Report for Congress, NATO: Article V and Collective Defense, at 
http:/ /www.fas.org/man/ crs/97-717f.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2001). 
18 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, supra note 2; DoN CooK, FoRGING ThE ALLIANCE 
204 (1989). 
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Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and 
maintain international peace and security.19 
C. Status of NATO and Article Five 
1. Pre-September 11, 2001 
NATO's purpose has always been to enhance the stability, well-
being, and freedom of its members through a system of collective de-
fense.20 The end of the Cold War, the collapse ofthe U.S.S.R., and the 
current disarray of the Russian military have called into question the 
continued importance of a NATO alliance.21 Indeed, official NATO 
doctrine no longer describes Russia as an enemy.22 In fact, over the 
last fifty years, NATO has restructured itself to include peacekeeping 
and crisis management tasks, undertaken in cooperation with non-
member countries and with other international organizations.23 
In 1997, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright explained the 
changing role of NATO while answering the Senate Armed Services 
Committee's questions about both NATO's collective defense role and 
against whom the modern alliance was defending.24 She stated: 'The 
threat is basically ... the instability within the region which has in fact 
created two world wars.25 But there is also the possibility of an outside 
threat.26 There is a possibility of threats from various parts outside the 
region, to the south, that we have to guard against. "27 
This attention to threats outside the Russian region was further 
highlighted in April 1999.28 At their Summit meeting in Washington, 
D.C., NATO Heads of State and Government approved the Alliance's 
new Strategic Concept, which recognized that the dangers of the Cold 
War had given way to new opportunities and risks.29 These risks in-
cluded uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic 
19 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1. 
20 See Gall is, supra note 17. 
21 See id. 
22 !d. 
23 NATO: Welcome to NATO, supra note 11. 
24 Galli.s, supra note 17. 
25 !d. 
26 !d. (emphasis added). 
27 !d. 
28 See The Alliance's Strategic Concept, at http:/ /www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-
065e.htm (last visited Nov. I, 2002). 
29 !d. 
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area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alli-
ance, which could evolve rapidly.30 NATO recognized that "ethnic and 
religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at 
reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can 
lead to local and even regional instability. "31 Treaty members believed 
that solidarity and cohesion within the Alliance, through daily coop-
eration in both the political and military spheres, would ensure that 
no single Ally would be forced to rely upon its own national efforts 
alone in dealing with basic security challenges.32 
Most importantly, the Strategic Concept reaffirmed that Article 
Five and Article Six33 (which defines an armed attack on a member 
nation) of the North Atlantic Treaty would cover any armed attack on 
the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction or source.34 It rec-
ognized that Alliance security interests could be affected by other 
risks of a wider nature, "including acts of terrorism, sabotage and or-
ganized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. "35 
With respect to collective defense under Article Five, the NATO 
members agree that the combined military forces of the Alliance must 
be capable of deterring any potential aggression against it, of stop-
ping an aggressor's advance as far forward as possible should an at-
tack nevertheless occur, and of ensuring the political independence 
and territorial integrity of its member states. 36 
2. September 11, 2001: Attack on the United States of America 
On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four California-
bound planes from three airports on the Eastern Seaboard, resulting 
!IJ[d. 
~I Id. 
~2 Id. 
33 For the purpose of Article Five, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is 
deemed to include an armed attack: (1) on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or 
North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Is-
lands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the 
Tropic of Cancer; (2) on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or 
over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the 
Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterra-
nean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer. North Atlantic Treaty, 
supra note 1. 
ll4 The Alliance's Strategic Concept, supra note 28. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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in the worst terrorist attack ever on U.S. soil.37 The hijackers crashed 
two of the passenger planes into the World Trade Center in New York, 
toppling the II 0-story twin towers and killing everyone on board the 
jets and thousands on the ground.38 Another passenger plane crashed 
into the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C., leaving a gaping chasm 
in the nation's hub of military power, killing everyone on board the 
aircraft and more than one hundred on the ground. 39 Within the 
hour, a fourth airliner crashed eighty miles southeast of Pittsburgh, 
killing everyone on board.40 In all, 266 people perished in the four 
planes and more than three thousand others are currently listed as 
missing and presumed dead.41 The American outcry for justice reso-
nated throughout the world and representatives from other NATO 
nations have similarly condemned the attacks.42 
3. Post-September II: NATO's Response 
On September I2, 200I the North Atlantic Council reconvened 
in response to the attacks perpetrated against the United States. 43 The 
Council agreed that if it was determined that this attack was directed 
from abroad against the United States, it would be regarded as an ac-
tion covered by Article Five of the NATO Treaty.44 A statement issued 
by the Council stated: 
The commitment to collective self-defence embodied in the 
Washington Treaty [the NATO Treaty] was first entered into 
in circumstances very different from those that exist now, 
37 Geraldine Sealey et al., Acts of Terror, ABC NEWS.COM, Sept. 11, 2001, available at 
http:/ /abcnews.go.com/ sections/us/DailyNews/WfC_MAIN01 0911.html; Michael Grun-
wald, Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World Trade Center, Hit Pentagon, THE WASHINGTON 
PosT, Sept. 12, 2001, at AI.; see Timeline of Events, at http:/ /www.cstratfor.com/home/ 
timeline.htm. 
!!8Jd. 
!9 /d. 
40 /d. 
41 Serge Schmemann, Hijacked jets Destroy Twin Towers and Hit Pentagon, THE N.Y. TIMES 
ON THE WEB, Sept. 12, 2001, available at http:/ /www.nytimes.com/learning/teachers/ 
featured_articles/20010912wednesday.html; Still Unbearable, But &tter, N.Y. llMES, Nov. 25, 
2001, available at http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2001/ll/25/weekinreview/25week.html? 
searchpv=past7days. 
42 Condemnation and Condolences, ABC NEws.coM, Sept. 11, 2001, available at http:/ I 
abcnews.go.com/ sections/world/DailyN ews/wtc_01 0911_ worldreax.html. 
43 Statement by the North Atlantic Counci~ NATO Press Release, at http:/ /www.nato.int/ 
docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm (last visited Nov. I, 2002). 
44 NATO: U.S. Evidence 'Compelling', CNN.com, at http:/ /www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD 
I europe/10/02/inv.nato.if/index.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2002). 
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but it remains no less valid and no less essential today, in a 
world subject to the scourge of international terrorism. 
When the Heads of State and Government of NATO met in 
Washington in 1999, they paid tribute to the success of the 
Alliance in ensuring the freedom of its members during the 
Cold War and in making possible a Europe that was whole 
and free. But they also recognised the existence of a wide va-
riety of risks to security, some of them quite unlike those that 
had called NATO into existence. More specifically, they con-
demned terrorism as a serious threat to peace and stability 
and reaffirmed their determination to combat it in accor-
dance with their commitments to one another, their interna-
tional commitments and nationallegislation.45 
83 
On October 2, in a classified briefing, U.S. officials presented to 
NATO "clear and compelling" evidence establishing that Osama bin 
Laden and his reputed terrorist organization, al-Qaeda, were respon-
sible for the September 11 attacks on the United States.46 The U.S. 
presentation was not a forensic legal case, but rather was entirely oral 
and "descriptive."47 It addressed the results of the continued investiga-
tion and established the link between Osama bin Laden, al- Qaeda, 
and the terrorist attack.48 Mter receiving this evidence, NATO deter-
mined that the United States had fulfilled its obligation to show that 
the source of the attacks was overseas and, for the first time in its fifty-
two year history, invoked Article Five.49 
Mter NATO invokes Article Five, each Ally must then consider 
what assistance it should and will provide. 5° In practice, there are con-
sultations among the Allies, and the North Atlantic Council will de-
cide any collective action taken by NAT0.51 The North Atlantic Coun-
cil, comprised of ambassadors from each of the member countries, 
stands at the top of the Alliance's pecking order and determines the 
policy direction through consensus.52 The United States can also per-
45 Statement ITy the North Atlantic Counci~ NATO Press Release, supra note 43. 
46 NATO Ready for Terror War, CNN.coM, Oct. 4, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/ 
2001/WORLD/europe/10/04/ret.nato.support/index.html. 
47 NATO Accepts Case O!ttlining Role of bin Laden in U.S. Terror Attacks; bin Laden Guarded 
1Ty Afghan Rulers, FAcTii oN FILE WoRLD NEws DIGEST, Oct. 2, 2001, at AI. 
48 Id.; NATO Ready for Terror War, mpra note 46 . 
. 
49 NATO Formally Invokes Article Enabling Collective Self-Defense, supra note 3. 
5o What is Article 51, supra note 3. 
51 ld. 
52 NATO Command-Who's in Charge1, at http://www.europeaninternet.com/central 
europe/special/nato/natochar.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2002). 
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form independent actions, consistent with its rights and obligations 
under the United Nations Charter.53 Allies can provide any form of 
assistance they deem necessary to respond to the situation.54 'This 
assistance is not necessarily military and depends on the material re-
sources of each country. "55 Each individual member determines how 
it will contribute and confers with other members, bearing in mind 
that the ultimate aim is "to restore and maintain the security of the 
North Atlantic area. "56 
To implement security objectives and strategic principles, the Al-
lied forces are continuously adapting to provide capabilities to protect 
peace and manage crises. 57 NATO does not possess independent 
armed forces of its own.58 Most forces available to NATO remain un-
der full national command and control until they are assigned by the 
member countries to undertake particular assignments.59 The role of 
NATO's political and military structures is to provide the advance 
planning required to enable national forces to accomplish these tasks 
and establish the organizational arrangements needed for their joint 
command, control, training, and exercising.60 
By early October, NATO had followed up its expressions of soli-
darity with some concrete assistance.61 The most visible support was 
the deployment of Airborne Warning and Control System Aircraft 
(AWACS) to the United States.62 These NATO planes were U.S.-built, 
specially equipped Boeing 707s, and were part of NATO's arsenal of 
24 AWACS based in Geilenkirchen, Germany, and Waddington, Eng-
land.63 Along with seventy-four U.S. NATO personnel, crewmembers 
from eleven other countries-including fifty-five from Germany, 
twenty-two from Canada, eleven from Belgium and eleven from It-
aly-were deployed to the United States.64 Additionally, NATO Secre-
tary-General George Robertson announced eight measures including 
53 What is Article 57 supra note 3. 
54 See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1. 
55 What is Article 57, supra note 3. 
56 Id. 
57 NATO's Strategy And Force Structure, at http:/ /www.europeaninternet.com/central 
europe/special/nato/natostru.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2002). 
58 NATO in the 21st Century, at http:/ /www.nato.int/docu/21-cent/2lst_eng.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2002). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See NATO Aircraft Guard U.S. Skies, supra note 5. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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over-flight clearance for military aircraft, access to ports and airfields, 
increased intelligence sharing, and the deployment of NATO naval 
forces in the eastern Mediterranean.65 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Does Article Five Create Any Affirmative Obligations? 
When Article Five is invoked, the Allies are obliged to assist each 
other by taking forward, individually and in concert with other Allies, 
such action as deemed necessary.66 Each Ally is individually responsi-
ble for determining what it deems necessary to fulfill its Article Five 
obligation.67 This raises the issue: if member nations have the ability 
to determine their own involvement, does any obligation really ex-
ist?68 The NATO Charter is a framework for very broad cooperation 
among its members.69 Not only does the charter provide for a military 
alliance to prevent or repel aggression, but also for ·~oint action in 
political, economic, and social fields. "70 However, because there are 
no specific obligations written into the Treaty, it remains uncertain 
whether Article Five is militarily functional or if, instead, the threat of 
military action might only serve to encourage economic activity and a 
sense of safety. 71 
To determine the implications and obligations on member na-
tions, examining the designs of the framers is crucial,72 In 1949, the 
crafting of Article Five involved the most "far-reaching Senate deci-
sion on United States foreign policy since the founding of the Repub-
lic. "73 The original drafting and wording of Article Five included mul-
tiple rounds of negotiations, political discussions, and open debates.74 
During the drafting period, two exisitng treaties were examined and 
discussed as possible models: the Rio Treaty75 and the Brussels 
66 Statement to the Press Oct. 4, 2001, at http:/ /www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/ 
s011004b.htm. 
66 What is Article 51, supra note 3. 
s7 Id. 
66 See id. 
69 MUNRO MAcCLOSKEY, PACTS FOR PEACE 53 (1967). 
7o Id. 
71 See id. 
72 See CooK, supra note 18. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 205. An armed attack by any state against a Party shall be considered as an at-
tack against all the Parties, and, consequently, each Party undertakes to assist in meeting 
86 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 26:77 
Treaty.76 The major difference between the two potential models was 
the Rio pact's undertaking to "assist in meeting the attack," without 
using the word "military," and the Brussels Treaty's pledge to "afford 
the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in 
their power."77 Both models were considered deficient; therefore, nei-
ther could be wholly incorporated.78 Neither model appropriately 
defined the commitment the United States wanted to undertake-the 
Brussels model went too far, and the Rio model did not go far 
enough.79 Drafters wanted to avoid any treaty wording that might 
seem to constrain their action merely to "meeting the attack. "80 Addi-
tionally, they did not feel that all countries should be expected to give 
military aid in the event of an attack.81 Iceland, for example, main-
tained no military forces but offered a valuable base.82 
"Not since the ratification of the Constitution of the United 
States have so many men spent so much time drafting and debating so 
few words. "83 However, these semantics played an important role in 
gaining both British and Senate approval.84 The British felt that the 
new Treaty should make plain beyond any misunderstanding that 
military action would be employed if trouble occurred, and the Sen-
ate wanted assurances that the new Treaty would not circumvent its 
power.85 American framers did not want any implication that there 
would be an automatic commitment and, therefore, sought to mini-
mize the importance of the word "military" in the pledge of mutual 
assistance.86 The drafters encountered numerous arguments and 
stalemates over the specific language.87 As negotiations over phraseol-
ogy deteriorated, President Truman secretly intervened and devised a 
the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense rec-
ognized by Article Fifty·(>ne of the Charter. Id. 
76 Id. H any Party should be the object of an armed attack in the area covered by the 
Treaty, the other Parties will, in accordance with the provision of Article Fifty-one of the 
Charter, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their 
power. Id. 
77 CooK, supra note 18, at 205. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
80 Id. at 206. 
81 Id. 
82 CooK, supra note 18, at 206. 
88 Id. at 204. 
st See id. at 213. 
86 See id. 
86 Id. 
87 See CooK, supra note 18, at 209. 
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phrasing that appeased both the British and the Senate.88 Instead of 
using the word "military" in Article Five, the substitute wording "in-
cluding the use of armed forces," was to be separated by commas 
from the words "such action. "89 This change in punctuation and se-
mantics gave the British the language they requested while enabling 
senatorial minds to conclude that there was no automatic commit-
ment to the use of force that would usurp senatorial or constitutional 
practice.90 
In 1949, at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, member ex-
pectations were very different from the attitudes and expectations of 
modern times.91 At the time of inception, NATO's largest enemies 
were Russia and the spread of communism.92 America recognized that 
Russia would most likely focus its aggressions on European countries, 
which might put strains on U.S. military forces. 93 Before the Treaty 
was signed, Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange stressed Nor-
way's need for prompt military assistance from the United States as a 
reassurance against a growing onslaught of Soviet threats and domes-
tic Communist agitation.94 Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated 
publicly that future demands for American military help would ex-
ceed supplies and that, in general, there would have to be priorities 
''where the U.S. has commitments or interests. "95 At the time, the 
United States assumed that any NATO military support needed would 
be in Europe, and therefore wanted to leave its military commitments 
intentionally vague.96 Because the invocation of Article Five followed 
an attack on the United States and not Europe, this vagueness may 
haunt those who advocated for it most strongly.97 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report recommended 
three conditions that must occur prior to U.S. involvement: 
First, U.S. contributions to collective defense "must supple-
ment, rather than replace, the efforts of the other partici-
pants on their behalf." ... Second, a President must follow 
BB Id. at 213-14. 
89 Id. at 213. 
90 Id. 
91 See McNAMARA, supra note 7. 
92 See generally id. 
93 See CooK, supra note 18, at 216. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 217. 
96 See id. 
97 See id. 
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"constitutional processes" for the U.S. to become involved in 
any security arrangement or conflict .... Third, for the U.S. 
to fulfill a collective defense commitment, U.S. national in-
terests must clearly be affected.98 
B. The Fall ofthe U.S.S.R. 
Some observers believe that the importance of Article Five in the 
absence of a Russian threat is reduced, at least temporarily.99 As the 
Cold War came to a close and the Soviet Union collapsed, some called 
for an end to the NATO Alliance that had played an essential role in 
countering Soviet military power for the previous forty years.1°0 Oth-
ers, impressed with the enduring need for transadantic security coop-
eration, called upon NATO to adopt new missions, beyond its tradi-
tional role of territorial defense, aimed at meeting new security 
challenges.Iot Since the early 1990s, NATO has begun to adopt "new 
missions," such as crisis management and peacekeeping, known as 
"non-Article Five missions. "1°2 Critics express concern over the grow-
ing importance of non-Article Five missions, citing that this is making 
the Alliance more of a collective security than a collective defense al-
liance.103 A collective security organization resolves disputes among its 
members, whereas a collective defense organization assists a member 
state under attack by an outside country.1°4 Because the North Adan-
tic Treaty contains no provisions that allow its members to participate 
in peacekeeping non-Article Five operations, some feel that the col-
lective defense role has been clouded.tos 
Another issue critics feel could undermine the viability of Article 
Five is the problem of "regionalization" within NATO: countries in 
one region of the Alliance are concerned about dangers inherent in 
their geographic neighborhoods that may not direcdy affect Allies in 
other regions.1°6 This has created new issues that bring into question 
98 Id. 
9? Gallis, supra note 17. 
1oo David Ochmanek, NATO's Future: Implications for U.S. Military Capabilities and Posture, 
at http:/ /www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1162/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2002). 
101 Jd. 
102 Gallis, supra note 17. 
103 See id. 
1o4 Jd. 
105 &eid. 
106 See id. 
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the support for Article Five.l07 For example, when Turkey agreed to 
lend its bases as a staging area for air strikes during the Persian Gulf 
War, Turkish officials indicated that they might invoke Article Five if 
Iraq retaliated.l08 Members of the German Bundestag, who were criti-
cal of the United States' involvement, voiced their opinion pro-
nounsing that "a missile attack on Turkish territory would not require 
a NATO response" because the United States had acted provoca-
tively.l09 
C. The Significance of Who Rallied and Who Did Not 
Mter the September II attacks on the United States, a NATO 
source said that Secretary-General Robertson had called for the invo-
cation of Article Five for two reasons-to express political solidarity 
with the United States and to convey a message to terrorists that ''we 
are prepared to face you collectively. "110 As of October 24, 200I, Brit-
ain had been actively participating, flying bombing missions and of-
fering troops, and France and Germany stood ready.11 1 NATO denies 
that other countries are less committed; however, analysts articulate 
that "some NATO countries quietly disagree-arguing behind closed 
doors that the conflict in Mghanistan is too far away. "112 Mghanistan 
is a long way outside the NATO area and probably "too far outside to 
be acceptable to a number of countries inside the alliance. "113 Experts 
have suggested that while military forces from NATO countries will 
almost certainly be involved in the coalition gathering behind the 
United States, it is looking less and less likely that action will be under 
a NATO banner.l14 Defense experts have also stated that the United 
States wants to control the military campaign, unconstrained by the 
consensus needed in NATO decision-making.115 If this is the case, Ar-
ticle Five appears to be beneficial, or at least useful, only to countries 
that have a small, non-existent or ineffective military. 
1o1 See Gall is, supra note 17 
108 ld. 
1o9 Id. 
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D. U.S. Paternalism: Does the United States Want NATO'S Support? 
Publicly, President George W. Bush has stated that the United 
States is grateful for NATO's support and that "together, we're build-
ing a very strong coalition against terror, and NATO is the corner-
stone of that coalition. "116 Contrary to this statement, however, is the 
United States' failure to make specific requests for support from 
NATO.l17 In fact, there has been growing frustration over the United 
States' seeming indifference to international offers for military sup-
port.l18 One possible reason for the United States' failure to make 
specific requests may relate to control of the operation.l19 If the 
United States does not ask for outside assistance, it retains total con-
trol of the operation; if, however, the United States asks NATO or 
other countries to provide substantial support, the United States 
might be obligated to cede some ofthat control}2° 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Historical Debate Comes Full Circle 
The debate over semantics that arose prior to the inception of 
the North Atlantic Treaty has the potential to haunt member na-
tions.l21 During drafting, the United States--expecting that NATO 
would be a protection against Russian encroachment in 
Europe-explicitly stated that it did not want any language included 
that would insinuate automatic military commitment upon invocation 
of Article Five}22 Drafters declined to follow the examples set forth by 
prior treaties; instead, they wanted to show that strong force would 
meet any attack, while, at the same time, limiting member nations' 
automatic commitmen ts.l23 
116 NATO Aircraft Guard U.S. Skies, supra note 5. 
117 Stephen Castle & Andrew Grice, Campaign Against Terrorism: Policy-Blair Will Urge 
Bush to Accept Europe's Help, ThE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 6, 2001, at 6; see 'Difficult Territory' for 
NATO, supra note Ill. 
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122 See id. 
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In theory, this both provides a powerful defense and demon-
strates respect to individual nations' constitutions.124 In practice, how-
ever, a member nation is under no obligation to employ its military or 
provide other assistance.125 The Treaty's language, "such action as it 
deems necessary," leaves too much discretion in the hands of member 
nations.l26 The drafters' decision to exclude specific obligations has 
the potential to backfire. For instance, if each member nation decides 
to only provide a minimal level of assistance, or worse, none at all, 
then Article Five is not viable. While this has not been a substantial 
factor in America's efforts to track the al-Qaeda network, an attack on 
a smaller or militarily weaker member of NATO might yield different 
results.127 
For example, if the Netherlands were attacked instead of the 
United States, the number of troops fighting the War on Terrorism 
would be significantly smaller.128 First, the Netherlands do not possess 
the same military faculties as the United States. Second, before the 
United States or any other member of NATO provided assistance, it 
would calculate whether its own national interest is clearly affected,l29 
H each nation decided either that it did not have the capacity to 
"lend" military support or that its national interest is not clearly af-
fected, only a minimal level of assistance would be provided.130 In 
such a situation, an armed attack against one nation would not really 
be considered an attack against all nations. 
H, however, specific military obligations were written into the 
Treaty, member countries, including the United States, would be as-
sured that the necessary assistance would be provided. The stipulated 
obligations could remain broad yet provide at least minimal require-
ments in the event of an attack. Such explicit obligations would also 
serve as a substitute for the pronounced enthusiasm and unity that 
existed between member nations at the time of the North Atlantic 
Treaty's inception.l31 
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125 See grmeraUy id. at 212. 
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B. When Can We Appraise the Strength of Article Five? 
The invocation of Article Five following the September 11, 2001 
attacks on the United States does not adequately display NATO mem-
ber countries' obligations for two reasons.l32 First, the United States 
has intentionally chosen not to request military support from 
NAT0.133 The United States does not want to relinquish the control it 
has over the military operations taken as a consequence of the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 attacks and fears that NATO's involvement might 
take away some of that power.l34 Second, the United States has the 
largest and most advanced military force in the world, indicating that 
the assistance of other NATO nations may not be necessary to counter 
the terrorist attacks.135 The true test of Article Five's power will occur 
when a NATO member that does not have the facilities or capabilities 
to respond in such an aggressive fashion is attacked. 
C. Collective Defense-Not Collective Security 
NATO is a military alliance whose function is to deter and fight 
wars, not merely an association for political cooperation.136 With the 
end of the Cold War and a lack of a clear adversary, the NATO Alli-
ance has searched for a purpose.l37 This purpose has expanded deep 
into the realm of a collective security organization.l38 While it appears 
that the two should be able to co-exist, combining the two functions 
creates problems.l39 
"Collective security is designed to be inclusive; any country can 
join, and any country, even a member, can become an enemy that 
must then be disciplined by other members. "140 Alliances, however, 
are very different.Hl Unlike collective security systems, alliances are 
exclusive because they have a particular enemy in mind.142 To main-
tain its role as a collective defense organization, NATO should cease 
132 See NATO One Part of Anti-Terror Force, supra note 113. 
133 See id. 
134 See id.; 'Difficult Territory'Jor NATO, supra note 111. 
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its role as a collective security organization, which forces constant re-
interpretation of its treaty; rather, it should face squarely the necessity 
of formally defining itself in today's world, as opposed to the world it 
faced in 1949.143 
Some argue that because the Atlantic Council provides strategic 
direction for NATO's military arm and the North Atlantic Council in 
turn receives its guidance from the member states, logically the North 
Atlantic Council may reinterpret its treaty in any manner it chooses.l44 
While there is some legitimacy to this argument, it is not complete.145 
As one study suggests, most European Allies simply have neither the 
inclination nor the means to conduct such collective security opera-
tions.146 
In the next Strategic Concept, member nations should consider 
separating the seemingly dual roles of the North Atlantic Treaty. The 
charter should retain its collective defense function and specifically 
determine the roles member nations are expected to play in the event 
of an Article Five invocation. To eliminate the problem of collective 
security missions interfering with the strength of Article Five and to 
dampen the disinterest of member nations' involvement, such a func-
tion should be kept separate from this Treaty. 
CONCLUSION 
Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty is a collective defense 
clause created for the protection of all member nations. U nfortu-
nately, nations lacking a sizeable military force may find themselves 
without assistance if no specific member obligations are written into 
the Treaty. Such obligations would ensure that all nations would be 
protected and an attack on one nation would truly be considered an 
attack on all nations. Additionally, the strength of Article Five should 
not be clouded by a collective security function. Such a function 
should be either separated within the Treaty or incorporated into an 
entirely separate treaty. 
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